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Type of publication: Straipsnis Clarivate Analytics Web of Science ar/ir Scopus / Article in Clarivate Analytics Web of Science or / and Scopus (S1)
Field of Science: Filosofija / Philosophy (H001)
Author(s): Gordon, John-Stewart
Title: What do we owe to intelligent robots?
Is part of: AI & Society: journal of knowledge, culture and communication. New York : Springer, 2020, Vol. 35, iss. 1
Extent: p. 209-223
Date: 2020
Keywords: Artificially intelligent robots;Moral status;Moral rights;Moral agency;Full ethical agents;Machine rights
Abstract: Great technological advances in such areas as computer science, artificial intelligence, and robotics have brought the advent of artificially intelligent robots within our reach within the next century. Against this background, the interdisciplinary field of machine ethics is concerned with the vital issue of making robots “ethical” and examining the moral status of autono-mous robots that are capable of moral reasoning and decision-making. The existence of such robots will deeply reshape our socio-political life. This paper focuses on whether such highly advanced yet artificially intelligent beings will deserve moral protection (in the form of being granted moral rights) once they become capable of moral reasoning and decision-making. I argue that we are obligated to grant them moral rights once they have become full ethical agents, i.e., subjects of morality. I present four related arguments in support of this claim and thereafter examine four main objections to the idea of ascribing moral rights to artificial intelligent robots
Affiliation(s): Filosofijos katedra
Humanitarinių mokslų fakultetas
Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas
Appears in Collections:Universiteto mokslo publikacijos / University Research Publications

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