Konstitucija monocentrinėje teisės sistemoje

Abstract

In practice, evidence of the legal power of the Constitution (aspect de jure) appears as a problematic problem of law, sociology of law. The extents of expressis verbis expression of the Constitution do not change the meaning of the Constitution itself for ensuring the hierarchal functionality of the legal system, therefore, any expression of expressis verbis form of the Constitution is sufficient that on its ground any question of legitimacy arising in the system of this law would be decided and resolved. While ensuring the functionality of the legal system, the expressis verbis "limitation problem" of the Constitution is decided by interpreting the Constitution as a systematic document. The interpretation of the official constitutional doctrine becomes the only Standard of perception of the Constitution which may be applied not only dejure but already also defacto while deciding the questions of legitimacy of legal acts. The Constitution, being an act of the supreme legal power not only ensures its exceptional position in the legal system, but it also imperatively decides the hierarchal explicitness of norms of the whole legal system. The priority of the legal power of the Constitution creates a monocentrist legal system in which the position of any other legal act is the result of constitutional determinacy (in the context of legal power). The inner logic of the structure of monocentrist legal system does not provide for any independent (the aspect of legitimacy) subsystems. The logical structure of monocentristics of the legal system is based on several legal facts. First of all, the Constitution is a legal act of the supreme legal power. Second, the Constitution establishes not only its exceptional legal power, but also enshrines the hierarchal nature of norms of the whole and united legal system. Third, the supreme legal power of the Constitution and the systemic nature of its understanding oblige us to perceive the Constitution as a legal act with no gaps. Fourth, no subsystems (branches, institutes and groups of norms of law) or individual opinions exist in the legal system the question of whose legitimacy would be unsolvable in the context of the hierarchy of the legal acts.