Czynnik narodowościowy, jako metoda pracy sowieckich służb bezpieczeństwa w walce z Kościołem katolickim (na przykładzie archidiecezji Wileńskiej)

Abstract

Sovietų saugumo tarnybos suvokė tautinio veiksnio reikšmę kovoje su Katalikų Bažnyčia Lietuvoje, ypač Vilniaus arkivyskupijoje, kur buvo mėginama pasinaudoti tautine įtampa tarp lietuvių ir lenkų. Nepaisant to, bandymas panaudoti tautinius jausmus kaip atsvarą krikščioniškosioms vertybėms ir Bažnyčios gerovei nepavyko dėl hierarchų, tokių kaip arkivyskupas Mečislovas Reinys, dvasininkų ir katalikų bekompromisės pozicijos. Priešingai saugumo lūkesčiams, lenkų ir lietuvių katalikai netgi susivienijo gindami savo teises. Taip pat kalbama apie mėginimą daryti įtaką popiežiui Jonui Pauliui II, kad jis nustatytų Vilniaus arkivyskupijos ribas Lietuvos TSR teritorijoje. Tai būtų reiškę, jog Apaštalų Sostas pripažįsta sovietų okupaciją Lietuvoje

The nationality factor was important for the Soviet Security Services. More than 80% of the residents of Lithuania were Lithuanians; however, there were regions where national minorities constituted the majority. The majority of residents in Vilnius region were Poles. The Soviet Security Services carefully gathered information about relationships between Polish and Lithuanian clergy. The Communist authorities believed that the nationality factor could prevail over the concern for the interest of the Catholic Church in relations between Polish and Lithuanian priests. In 1940, during the first Soviet occupation, Security Service agent, characterizing the situation in the Archdiocese of Vilnius, wrote that joint activity of the Polish and Lithuanian clergy is impossible. After the arrest of the Ordinary of the Archdiocese of Vilnius the Archbishop R. Jałbrzykowski, it was predicted that the Archbishop M. Reinys would agree to cooperate with the Security Services in exchange for privileges for Lithuanian Catholics. However, the Archbishop did not agree to cooperate. He was arrested in 1947 and died in prison for especially dangerous criminals in 1953 in Russia. The KGB skillfully played with the nationality factor urging Lithuanian priests to denounce the Poles and Polish priests to denounce Lithuanians. They were promised the defense of the rights of Lithuanian or Polish Catholics. It should be noted that the absolute majority of priests fulfilled their obligations and paid a very high price for their lack of compromises. They were killed or sent to working camps. Lithuanian and Polish priests understood that only together they could counteract the Sovietization of the society. The KGB carefully noted such attitudes and tried to nip them in the bud; for example, the joint Polish-Lithuanian initiative to send the delegation of Catholics to Moscow to stop the closing of Vilnius Cathedral in 1949. [...]